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Expert systems hold great prorr~ise for technical aplication aress 
such as medical diagnosis or engineering design. They are, we argue, less 
promising for management applications. The reason is that manage-- b are 
not experts in the sense of possessix a forrnal body of knowledge whch 
they apply. The limitations of artificial intelligence approaches in 
managerial domains is explained in terms of semantic change, motivating 
attention towards management (decison) support systems. 
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INTRODUCTIOK 
AI is getting market appeal. Expert systems, robotics and 5th gen- 
eration technology are ge ttisg serious recog nition in the economic plans 
for 1984 and beyond. The attempt here is to assess the potential impact 
of AI future technology on commercial organizations and other social 
institutions. Technology assessment suffers the lack of a convincing 
methodology. Hence the strategy here is not to try to predict the actual 
course of A1 innovations, but rather consider what would be the theoreti- 
cal limits to the technology. 
Our concern is mainly with Al technology in organizations, i.e., with 
groups of people working in cooperation. These remarks are not intended 
to apply to industrial robots, nor to single user expert systems, but 
rather to  what might be called a 'knowledge-based information system' 
(KEiS). Such ap~licat ions ~ ~ o i l l c i  s e e n  to be the eventual result of a con- 
vergence of database macagement with Al knowiecige representation. 
To simplify the argmilent and cvoid large literature surveys, we take 
the liberty of imagining a future IBIS as a large scale theorem prover 
operatiw on a dateSase of logizal assertions about the organization 2nd 
its environment. This trend might be discerned from the litereture on 
'logic and databases' (Gallzire e t  nl. 1978, i98l) and the logic progrnm- 
ming discussions of relational datebases (Clocksin m d  Mellish 1981, 
Coelho 1980, Ko~~alski  1979b). 
The question is, what could such a ?1?31S do? 
The principle function of an information system in organizations is to 
facilitate communication betv~een individuals thct are geographically 
and/or temporally separated. Unlike e.g., telephone or electronic mail, 
the advantage offered by an information system accessing a structures 
database is that i t  offers the possibility of making inferences oa the com- 
munications it intermediates. lnferencing facilitates the chunking of 
information (Miller 1956) necessary as communications flow upward in 
the management herarchy (Jacques 1976). 
Jay Galbraith (1973, 1977) observes that herarchy itself is an infor- 
mation processing device, helping the organization to cope with the con- 
flicting pulls of a complex environment vs the limited attention and 
bounded rationality of management (Simon 1955). Knowledge-based 
information systems would, we expect, reduce the complexity by taking 
over more and more managerial problem solving. 
But is there a limit? Ycouldn't the future, super-powerful, 
knowledge-based informat i~n system evzntual1~- eliminate the need for 
menagement? The arguments which f0110'~ lead to a negative conclusion. 
A1 will make an important contribution to management problems, but the 
brave new world of the future M-ill not only be built with technology. 
Arguments of t h s  sort tend to rely 03 the 'unsiructuredness' of the 
managerial tesk as the basis for a view that i n f o r ~ a t i o n  technology will at  
best aid, but not replace management (Gorry ~ n d  Scott-%!orton 1971, 
Keen and Scott-Xhorton 1978). Eut that argument eventually encounters a 
circularity if by 'structured problems' is meant those that have a decision 
algorithm. Technology has an untidy habit of advancing beyond problems 
that were previously thought impossible. 
The arguments given here are based on two interconnected themes. 
One is the problem of preferences (goals, values, free will), v h c h  we 
argue that conputers don't have. (Computers don't  intrinsically prefer 
chocolate to vanilla.) The other theme involves basic issues in semantics 
which, especially for organizations in dynamic, uncertain environments, 
provide fatal difficulties for even an idealized A1 system. 
The arguments, interestingly, have a certain parallel with issues of 
bureaucracy. Various insights can perhaps be exchanged be tween A1 
knowledge representation topics and the apparent limitations to bureau- 
cratic rationalization. 
A characteristic of machn2 intelligence is that it is 'rule based'. If 
we consider only this softw~-re aspeci (and i gno~e  differences in processor 
hardware), then the most ubiquitous and successf~d ~exampls  of mechani- 
cal cognition are bu:-eaucracies. Yet while the projects to create various 
types of xt if ici~l  iztelligence have a certain roEance and intellectual 
adventure aboui t h e n ,  the term 'bureaucracy' seerns 2t best dreary and 
more often spite!,&. It is leden r:ith negative connotations cf plodding, 
brutish orgenizetions, insensitive to the indil~dual; indifferent to the 
exceptional. 
Yet in more scientific usage, 'bureaucracy' is used neutrally as 
merely one form of administrctior,. The negative associations it has in 
popular usage gives empirical evidence that people's encounters with 
bureaucracies are often un2leasant. The definition of bureaucracy used 
here is based on I'feber (195S/1978), indiceting crganizations whose 
administration is based on explicit rules and procedures. This contrasts 
with an  idiosyncratic form of management based on persona! interest and 
the whms of the moment. Bureaucracies, then, are  organizations whose 
behavior is 'rationalized' to eliminate such idiosyncratic tendencies. This 
gives rise to a concept of organizational r o l e ,  and explicit, detailed job 
descriptions. Personnel become substitutable; the organization takes on 
a mechanical consistency and permanence that outlives its members. In 
Weber's words, 
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehu- 
manized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber 
Consider h o ~ i  this vieiv compares with standard models of compuia- 
tion. In automata theory (e.g.,  HopcroR and Ullmhn 1969), we vie?: a 
computer abstractly as a lenguage processor, transforming a n  input 
string of sjrmbols to output symbols (see Figure 1 a). In information sys- 
tems applications we can regard these cjrmbols as part of a commori 
language, cali it LAW, ~ h i c h  are assertions a b m t  the 'rea! world' (organi- 
zation.~! eiiviromient). These assertions are normally stored in the 
organization's d a t ~ b a s e  and the processor is invoked by queries, calls to 
application programs, etc.  Hence, what we call the 'automaton' here is 
meant to include the entlre set of application programs, DBKS software, 
- query interfaces, etc. (in   hat ever future software designs you like). 
The au to~ ia ton ,  as lawuzge prccessar, is regarded as a grammar. 
This grammar is itself de:ined in a notatior-, call it LC. Practically, LC 
correspor~ds tc  an arbitrary programming language." Ignoring efficiency 
considerations, we might regard LC as reducing to a set of production 
rules (Davis and King 1975) of the form 
IF <condition> THEN DO <action> 
If none of the various conditions are met,  that is, if no rule is actuated, 
the default is inaction. The machine doesn't do anything it 's not 
instructed to do by one of its rules. 
* It is common for LISP users and others to deny the disthction between dete and program. 
Distinctions however depend on expository purpose. We could of course consider the 
language formed in the  union of LRw and LC. ,The two languages are distinguished semantical- 
ly. The semantics of LRg i s  all those expressons in the information system which denote real 
world phenomene. The semantics of L is machine operations. These are of course hopeless 
ly intertwined in all present day irnpgmentations, which is why we resort to talking about 
idealized machines. 
A currently popular view of organizational management (e.g., March 
and Simon 1958) regards managers as information processors. Taking 
the metaphor literally, we might replace the automaton with a person 
(Figure lb) .  The 'programming' of this person might be in another 
language, LB, expressing the various bureaucratic rules and procedures 
this person is to follow. 
But if we regard LB (bureaucratic programming) abstractly in the 
way we did LC (computer programming), we encounter a problem if we 
use only production rules. As observed in a body of literature in 
organizs.tiona! psy chclogy arid sociology (e.g. ,  l~Caslo~!< 1943,  hIcGreg2:- 
1960, Cyert and hl:arch 11953, Karch a:id Olsen 1979) people are not nsic- 
ally id!e. They have their o ~ m  indivi6u.l interests, goals, aspirations, eic. 
which they are seekin2 to satisfy through their participation in the orgap- 
ization. 
When these col-respoa2 to the interests snZ gods  of the organization 
itself, we tend to rega1-d their independent behabior as 'initiat;ivel, other- 
wise it is considerec more as the dysfunctional pursuit of ' p e r son~ l  
interest'. LB (bureaucratic programming) therefore contains another 
basic aspect. It not only orders the execution of desired behavior, but 
restrains the performance of undesired behavior. In Lee (18BO), we sug- 
gest that  a primitive structure of bureauzrztic softyare would therefore 
include the basic operators of deontie logic (von Itfright 196B), namely, 
(for q an arbitrary action): 
O, q is obligatory 
P, q is permitted 
'% q is forbidden. 
Using negation, these operators are interdefinable. Permission to do q is 
equivalent to not being obligated not to do it (P, - "OWq), whlle forbid- 
d~ng q is being obligated not to do q (Fq - OWq). Likewise, permission 
and prohbition (forbidding) are negates (Fq - "Pq ; Pq - -Fq). 
To be adequate as a language for bureaucratic procedures, these 
operators need to include an aspect of contingency (correspon&ng to the 
conditions in production rules). Unfortunately, contingency is not 
straightforward in deontic logic, and a number of proposals appear 
(Hi!pinen 1031a, 1951b). Nate that discretiozary actions are those no', 
forbidden, hence permitted. A 'perfezt' bm-eaucl-acjr, in the sense of 
being complete!y riitionalized and determined, M-ould eliminate per-=is- 
sions  entire!^. Everytl-iing ~vould be e i t h ~ r  (contirigently) obligatorjr or 
forbiddea. 
Ths is of course a mazabre end unvrorkable design for any human 
organization. As Xorbert Wiener ( i9G7j argued in the early days of ccjrn- 
puting, such e x t r e r ~ e  regimentation is an inhuman use of human beirigs; 
activities zre not only ecoriomlcally but moral!y better left to 
machines. 
Jay Galbraith extends the info:-mation processing vie747 of orgenlzz- 
tions by classifying the environments they face on a two dimensional 
scale of 'complexity' and 'uncertainty' (Figure 2). 
Complexity might be measured in terms of the number of informa- 
tion processing steps (mferences) required to plan the organization's 
actions. 
Uncertainty is essentially the amount of surprise or unpredictability 
in the environment. This is different from simple contingencies, where 
the alternatives are foreseen, though the particular outcome is unknown. 
Uncertainty involves completely surprising events. Thus, as uncertainty 
increases, planning, even contingent planning, becomes less effective. 
The organization has to do more and more revision and adaptation whle 
the task is being performed. As an  analogy, consider planning a road trip. 
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You take along a spare tire, extra oil, etc. for the foreseeable contingen- 
cies. Then there is an earthquzke, which you didn't expect and so you 
have to completely revise your plans. 
Rationalization, whether by bureaucratic or computer programs, is 
most effective in situations where complexity is high but uncertainty is 
low. Surprise requires re-programmw, and that tends to be time con- 
suming for either type of software. Left to their own, however, human 
beings can be quite adaptable. So, Galbraith observes, a counter-strategy 
in highly uncertain environments is to rely more on individual discretion, 
rather than trying to pre-program the individual's behavior. This leads to 
what Burns and ~talker ' ( l961)  call 'organic' - as opposed to 'mechanis- 
tic' -forms of organization. 
Ths seems to be effectivs in ~ncei-tain eiiviron~ei=ts v;here complec- 
ity is  lo^. However, beyond certain fzirly modest levels, cqai6ed hum?> 
cognition suffers memory lirnitatioLx and computational biases (Slm.33 
1955, Miller 1956, Tversky 2nd Kaheman  197;). Hov;, then, should an 
organization which faces an  enri-ironrilent that is both complex and uncEr- 
tain be administ e r ed? 
It is in response to this question that  A1 research seems most 
promising. The appezl is thai .rvhile bureaucr2tic procedures are ge2- 
erally mi t ten  to be deterministic an6 inflexible, AI problen so!ti;lg 
research has led to approaches where numerous heuristics can be trie2 
for a particular problsm sariznt. If one strategy 60esr~'t  v~ork, we back- 
track and look for another. Several strategies may in fact be setisfactory 
in which case we can wisen Lhe scope to include less consequential p r o 5  
lem variables and so provide adaptive, responsive solutions thzt simple, 
deterministic bureaucratic rriethods don't uncover. 
So far we have considered only the character of the instructions 
given to the problem processor, automaton vs human administrator. The 
instructions were expressed in languages LC and LB respectively. We now 
consider the language LRv; which these entities process. Typically the 
input stream includes some description of the problem, while the output 
stream is a course of action (to be followed by other entities in the organ- 
ization, whether machine or human or both). 
Managerwnt texts ty?ic~.!ly dicdo th? activities of managers inio 
plcnnt:-~g a d  C P ~ Z L T O ~ .  In a platmirig p r ~ S ! e ~  the in2ut is current end 
predicted ir3orma;ioil a C ~ c t  the external environment and the output is a 
plan to be fo!lorr.:ed by suSordinate entities (departments, people, 
mechines) in the organization. In 2 control problem the input is curreni 
and predicted facts about the internzl environment as compzre6 to an 
existing plan. The o u t p ~ t  is a revision to the plcn. 
This view is q ~ l t e  compatible with the conception of plaming i11 -41. 
There are however two differences which eventuzlly limit the degree to 
which A1 technology cen tzke over manzgerne~t  zkes in the o~ganization. 
We refer to these as the 'ego' and the 'semantic' problems. 
A. The E p  P r o b l s ~  
People 1-lave preferences, conputers don't. Computers (as w-e knov; 
them) will never prefer chocolate to vanilla. By preference we mean 
basic or intrinsic values, as opposed to instrumental or intermediate 
goals. Chess programs, for instance, have intermediate goals leading to 
the winning of the game. The goal of winning itself, however, is presumed 
prior to the system design. 
The argument here is not absolute, but rather political. We could for 
instance imagine a robot with high priority heuristics for survival. This 
might lead down eventually to a sub-goals such as a taste for sweets or a 
compulsion to win a t  chess. However, we aren't  likely to allow such 
machines to indulge these preferences if they compete with our own. 
(Note how Asimov's robots (1978) are programmed to be socially inferior.) 
Robot suffrage is not forthcoming. 
The conve;-se conce7t to the sGcia2 r ight  to have an2 indlLge ore 's  
prefel-ences is i - ~ ~ 7 0 7 t ~ i b i l ; l Q  The outcome of a cornpilter frecd triel is 
never to put tho com2uter in jail. Interest l~gly,  not only people but zlsr, 
organizations ere granted this social status. k corporation (as wel!, a 
sovereign state) has inZependent legal resimnsibilitp; it can sign COP- 
tracts ,  can be sued, etc. 
The prefel-ewes (goals, va!ues) of an orgatlization are generdly 
regarded as deriving from the preferences of individu~ls. Capitdis:, 
econonics asscmes these to be the values of investors, Socizlist econorn- 
ics presumes these are imposes by the society a t  large. Theories of 
organization, however, tend to ascribe a larger role to the preferences of 
people within the organization. Cyert and March (1963) note that the 
influence of stcckholders in large corporations has come to be m i n i m ~ l ,  
and regard the preferences of managers as more significant in a predic- 
tive theory. Earlier, bureaucracies were characterized as orgznizatioiis 
where the influence of individual preferences was minimized. Mmagers 
fill prescribed roles and are substitutable over time. The organization's 
life is not limited to the life of its members. On the other hand, the 
mechanistic character of bureaucracy which gives it permanence, also 
fixes i ts  value structure. Hence railroads, post offices and the military 
continue to pursue ends that no longer coincide with social interests 
(Bouldmg 1978). 
In the other extreme, March and Olsen (1979) discuss the nature of 
organizations where the goals expressed in the organization's formal 
charter  are vague and difficult to measure - e.g., universities, research 
institutions, charity organizations, etc.  Here the organization's goals are 
heavily influenced by those of indl:.idu?l mmem5ers, an? shift ir, a flilis Ts:aj7 
in what they call a 'garbage c2s  process'. 
Deal and Kennedy (i9C2) provide an interesting intermediate 
viewpoint in their concept of 'corporzte culture' (see also Peters 1933). 
In numerous case examples, for instance IBS!, Genera! Electric, Dupont, 
and 'Japan, Inc.', they observe coorcIinateZ, cohesive behavior yet v:ithout 
heavy bureaucratic regulation. The differentiating veriable, they argue, 
is that these organizatior~s have b ~ l t  a s t r o n ~  organizetionz! cd tu r e  
which influences ar-d molds individual &ives and interests to coincide 
with the organizatim at  large. Conversely, individud preferences and 
values also exert influence on those of the organization. The dual 
membership of the individual in the corporate cult~u-e as ~veli as the cul- 
ture at  large ensures that the organization maintains goals and values 
compatible with its larger social context. 
The point is that indivisual preferences play an im2ortant role irL tne 
adaptation and goodness-of-fit of the organization to its social en-?iron- 
ment. While we might conceive of e scenario where a robot or information 
system also displayed intrinsic preferences, this would be socially inad- 
missible (and has been in all the science fiction to date). It is of course 
not the preference itself but the tendency to indulge that preference that  
matters. Having the right to indulge one's preferences (within socially 
defined bounds) amounts to political participation, a right still not won by 
all human beings, let alone robots. 
We observed in the beginning of this section that an important func- 
tion of managers is planning. Planning is also an important AI topic. 
However, one limitation of AI systems to do organizational planning is in 
the selection of the ultimate PI-eferences an5 vdues to which the plats  
are di:-ected. Another limitation, e se-r;laritic cne: is discusse6 next. 
B. The Semimtic PrubIeiz 
Everyone knows that computationz! sexantics is hard. vD'e argue 
that for management applicktions semeatics is in?ossible, so long as 
compaters don't have a social life. 
Semantics is a rather touchy subject, since there cre a nrmber of 
definitions that circulate and they are rather hard. to sepzrate. Gen- 
erally, semantics is the corresponden-e between a symbol system 
(language) and its referrents. 
In the first section we distinguished between LC, the language refer- 
ring to the computer and its operation, from Lxyi, which referred to the 
organizational environment. Tn cu-rent terminology this might be 
phrased as programming language semantics vs database semanti.cs. As 
before, we attempt to avoid the present debztes (e.g., various data 
management models vs semantic network representations) by skipping 
over aspects of psychological modeling, retrieval efficiency, etc, and 
assume that LRw can be characterized as a (first-order) pre&cate cal- 
c ulus l ang uag e . 
The other advantage of this assumption is that it helps to focus the 
immense literature on formal semantics without computational distrac- 
tions. In the prehcate  calculus (data management and semantic nets as 
well) we typically make the assumption that semantics follows syntax. 
That is, the semantics of complex expressions is constructible from the 
sercantics of its s j~ntac t ic  c o n ~ t i t u e ~ t s .  (Do~t j7  e t  zl. 18EI:Zh. 3 ) .  T h s  :s 
Frege's 'Principls of Com~ositionslity ' ." The ro!e of the usec!; lo,-iczl cox- 
nectives an6 quantifiers in coristructirg the s e m ~ s t i c s  of first order 
assertions is well studied (van Fraassen 1971). What remains is the  
semantics of the o7en vocabulzry of the logic, namely ii~dividuz! and 
predicate nernes. The epproaches a t  t h s  point divide roughly into tv . :~  
camps,  what we ivil call the eztoi?sias;zl and i n t e n s i g n a l  vie?,? oinis. 
Extensional Semnntizs 
The extensional viewpoint is doinizant in forrilal logic, originating 
mainly from the model theory of Tzrski (1955). Here, indlvidunl objects 
a re  regarded as primitive, leslving generic properties and relationships to  
be defined se t  theoreticelly. An interpretation or m o d e l ,  of a giver, (first 
order)  predicate logic therefore begins with the assumption of a domain 
of individuals, D, and  an  interpretation function, F, which maps individual 
names  to  individuals in  D, 1-place predicates t o  sabsets  of D, n-place 
predicates t o  relations on D, e tc .  Hence a model Id of a language L has 
the form 
This is entirely satisfactory as long as  the population of individuals i n  D 
can b e  clearly specified, and they don't  change. 
* Here we are speaking of formal, constructed languages. The principle of compodtionelity 
doesn't always hold in natural language, e.g., for proper nouns like 'Marilyn Monroe' or norni- 
nal compounds like 'red herring' where the referrent of the expression is not constructable 
from the referents of it's component words. 
Ho~::e:~er, a pro5:em for ~ i l c n ? . ~  ement applications is the? org~niza- 
tions a.xd their eni7iro,m.e-is dc chznge. Change is fundernental to 
econon~ic growth; it c m ' t  be ignored. An obvious step is to extend the 
model to indude a time Zirnension, T, so that  D includes all individusis 
existing at  different tirr.es. X02els of the language are then of the form: 
Ths ,  however, encounters difficu!ties when we consider aspects of 
the f u f u r e .  Much of management is concerned with p!anrf-ng. Since 
there may be a variety of a!ternate or contingent plans, we must likewise 
consider multiple futures. This leads to another extension to  the model 
including so-called possible ~vorlds, W, hence adopting models of the form: 
Ths  is essentially the ontology proposed by Kontague (see Do~vty et  
al: 1981, Lee 1981). While t h s  enables a  mathematical!^ elegant solution, 
the question is whether it is still semantics. If semantics is the 
correspondence between symbols and the world, but if the world is not 
merely the actual world (past and present) but also future and hypotheti- 
cal worlds, we have to consider how it is we know about these other 
worlds. 
Strawson (1959) points out that  the principle basis for our shared 
epistemology is reference within a common spatial/temporal framework. 
Possible worlds are mental constructions, Gedanken experiments. They 
are outside the framework of external reference and so are questionable 
as a basis for mutual understanding. We return to this problem shortly. 
Intensions1 Semantics 
The intensione! viewrpo;nt is more ch~racter is t ic  of the A! paradigm 
(especially semantic net representations). Here, it is not indivi?-ual 
objects that &re primitive, but rether generic properties and relation- 
ships. Particular objects and events zre seen as instances of these gen- 
eric concepts. For e:;atrqle, we postulate primitiv? conce?ts, MALE, 
FEKALE, SPOUSE, CHILD a.nd from these are able tc define the entire 
vocabulary of kinship relations. Pzrticular cases o: family trees, e tc ,  are 
regarded as 'ins'iantiations' of these generic co:lcepts. 
The intension~l a p p r ~ a c h  is entirely satisfactory for whet we might 
call idealized or artificial subject domeins, M-here the scope of variation is 
fixed theoretically or by explicit rules. However, the intensional 
approach also has difficulties,  especial!^ in describing real world domeins 
where no theoretical foundation exists. For example, suppose we want to 
develop a concept, LEMON. We then seek to e1abo:-ate the essential pro- 
perties of lemons. Ths  might be a property list somethng like: 
COLOR: YELLOW 
SHAPE: OVAL 
TEXTURE : BUMPY 
TASTE : ACID 
The problem, typically, with real world domains is that  we can't simply 
define what a LEMON is, but rather our definition has to correspond to 
what the users of the system conceive lemons to be. Now we run into the 
so-called 'criteria1 properties' problem. We want a set  of properties that  
in conjunction uniquely selects out lemons and only lemons from the 
various objects in the er1i7ironment. The 2roblern here is tv-sfo!?: that 
too many tliinzs walify (e.g., yellow limes) and the Sefirdti~n e~:cludes 
atypical lemons (e.g., green lemons, lemons that aren' t  ovsl, etc.).  
Yr'ittgenstein (1853/i958) is a classic eleboration of these diffici~lties. 
There is an interesting relationship between the effez'iiver,ess of the 
intensional appronzh and the status of- the science o? that subject 
domain. Chemistry, for  i~x'iecce, provides a criteria1 defiaition for water 
(as H20). Psycholc,gy, by contrast, has no critel-id definitions for such 
phenornenz as intelligence or creativi:;;. 
The problem seems all the worse in the social/econ3mic domains 
that are most common to management problems. Teke for i n s t a x e  the 
mudane exam2le of chairs. Is there a s i ~ z l e  physical characteristic that  
chairs have in common? Consider such exzmpies as rocking chzirs, 
stuffed chairs, been-bag chairs, plestic inflata5le chairs. I t  seems that  
what is common to them all is not what they are, but what we do vyith 
them, namely sit. But this is no longer a2  actual property, but rather a 
propensity or disposition, whch leads to similar epistemological difficul- 
ties as with possible worlds. (Rescher ( 1975:Ch.7) comments on disposi- 
tional properties and possible worlds.) 
A Sociological View of Semantics 
- -- 
Both the extensional and intensional approaches to semantics suffer 
epis temologic a1 difficulties, especially in the social/ec onomic domains 
typical for management. This leads to an examination of the mechanisms 
by which we come to know and use the terms of our everyday language. 
If we fo1lo~- the extensiozzl a?prczch, then cer main focus xill be  32 
our kno~vledge 2nd icier-tiflcation of indivic'-uzis (pzopk arrd objects). This 
brings zttentio-1 to the ser:iantics of pl-o>er nzriles and the identifica:ion 
codes we assign to machir~es and oiher objects. As Kent (1978) points out, 
these zre of f ~ l~d z men ia !  concern in datz precessing applications, map- 
pirg database recorss to invento~y, equipment, personnel, customers, 
su?plie:s, etc.  
How are these names associated to individuals? In the case of 
mznufactured objects, quite often the identifying name is stamped 
directly on the object. In the case of names of persons znC compaaies, 
the identification relies hezvily on honest reportip2 of their narnes by the 
entities themselves, e .g.,  on emp!oyment applications, sales orders, etc. 
The point is that  the organization doesn't have to r e c o g n i z ~  these indivi- 
duals through some collection of identifying properties, it is simply fold, 
e.g., "I am John Doe," "Here is the XYZ comparijT." 
The point applies much more broadly. Most of vrktat we knou- about 
other individuals (people, places, things) that are temporally or geo- 
graphcally distant is what we have been told. The proper name provides 
a tag to which various characteristics are attached. The names them- 
selves are passed from one person to the next in a series of 'causal 
chains' of reference, leading back to a direct identification of the indivi- 
dual. Sometimes, in the case of multiple names for the same individual, 
the causal chains may separate, leading to assertions like 
Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens 
having an infc:.:xakisre content rather ikan be i r i  a tauto!cglnal Identity. 
Kripke (1971, 1972) applies this concept of causal chains in a forv~ai-6 
fashion in charactorizi~g possible worlds. "Possible w?orids c:-e r~ot  far- 
away planets," they are rather c o ~ ~ s t r u c t e d ,  based on known, a c t u ~ l  refer- 
ences. 
Cocsider, for ir~stance, a scenario beginning with the supposiiisn that 
Ronald Reagan is bald. The question arises, how do you knov: it 's Ronald 
Reagan if, in this possible w ~ r l d ,  he has different properties. ( Y e  can 
exaggerate the case - suppose Ronald Rezgan is really a robot, mznu-fac- 
tured on Kars, etc. -this is called the problex of 'trans-world identifica- 
tion of individuals'.) Ikipl-:e's point is that v;e don't have to recogx i ze  
Ronald Reagan in this v,iorl<, we s t i p u l a t e  that he is the s e x e  in our con- 
struction of the scenario. The proper name Ronald Reagan is a 'rizid 
designator'. 
Putnam (i970, 1978) suggests a some:.vSat similar explanation to our 
understanding of generic concepts like 'lemon' and 'chair'. Consider the 
first example of 'lemons'. Being a poor cook, my concept of lemons is 
fairly rudimentary. I surely couldn't tell a lemon from a yellow lime. Yet 
I don't often make mistakes in shopping for them. How do I manage? 1 go 
to  the supermarket and look for the fruit section. There, typically, is a 
case labeled 'lemons', where 1 draw my selection. I rely heavily on the 
supermarket's knowledge to know what lemons are. But how does the 
supermarket know? They make purchases orders to a distributor 
requesting shpment  of 'lemons'. How does the distributor know? They 
order 'lemons' from certain fruit growers. How do the fruit growers 
know? Eventually the chain goes back to  a botanist or agronomist who 
has ce:-tain sciantific criteria f2r 1eno;-is. 
Kosv consider the coiicept, chair. Again sv~: car: foiloiv; the chain of 
refereace back, t h s  t l m  to c e r t ~ i n  chair mazufacturing com2anies. But 
how do they knov:. :$:hat a chair is? They specify that their products are 
chzirs. Thus one eiite~prising company may stuff burlap bags %iih shred- 
ded st;yrofoam an< mcrke: it i s  2. 'pil!o~:. cheir'. Another might fold and 
paint pieces G? cardboer2 sellng them as 'throv?-avxy chairs'. The suc- 
cess of their markziing also succeeds in modifying the concept of chair. 
The eifect of these 2:-gments is to iiltroduce a sociological concep- 
tion of semactics, whzt Schvartz (1977) calls the 'ne~v theory of refer- 
ence'. It gives a convincing accomi of wk~j7 semantics is so difficdt t o  do 
computationally: ser,lantizs isn't fuzzy, it's social. For many of our 
terms, e.g., lemori, chiir ,  the extensicn of the concept is quite exacting. 
A t hn g  is a lemon [chair) or it is not. Hosi-ever, the cclgniiion that  makes 
this discri~~iinztioii is not nn indiviZucl one, but rather a cooperation of a 
broad social netwo-k. As Putnzrn observes, we tend to regard words like 
hand tools ihat  we use insiiidually. For many words, a more fitting meta- 
phor is to compare them to a big ocean liner that requires a crew of hun- 
dreds for its operation. 
EXPERT SYSTEMS VS DECISION SUPPOHT SYSTEMS 
Expert systems are typically built to model individual expertise, e.g., 
a doctor, a travel agent, an automechanic. The view, generally, is of an 
independently operating problem solver. 
Maczgers dcYi1t q p e s r  to be e>:>eris in this same sense. Jv!intzSerg 
(1973), in an empiricel study of the activities of high leire! e:recutives: 
notes that a great pol-tion of marlagenial activity is spent in c o m m ~ ~ i c e -  
tion, observation and diitn gathering. K<oreover, some 70% of their time is 
spent in informa.! meetings and committees. Indeed, in this s a m ~ l e ,  
managers 01117 spent about 22% of thzir time in isolated concentration. 
The s ~ g e s t i o z  here is that m a a g e r s ,  rather then possessing an indicidu- 
aljzed expertise, are more like specialized nodes in a larger 'organizn- 
tional cogniticn'. Organizntions in turn, react and pcrticipate in a larger 
'social cognition' in their attempts to mzrket nev; products and/or nove! 
services. 
An important part of the manager's activity is to observe and under- 
stand changes and trends in the marlcet, the economic, legal and sociel 
environments. Much of this Is not simply shf t s  in magnitlude on pre- 
defined dimensional szales. (Were this so, mathernnticz! models would 
surely have a bigger impact on manzgerial practice.) Instead, mznagerid 
cognition often involves the modification of primitive concepts. For 
instance, the range of phenomena we call an 'automobile' changes from 
year to year. Each competitive innovation, each new marketing angle. 
each special interest group expands and re-organizes the phenomena the 
manager includes in his/her conceptual framework. And, given that  
his/her contact with the world is primarily through linguistic interac- 
tions, the semantics of organizational language is constantly shifting. 
Because mechanical inference relies on a stable, fixed semantics, the 
utility of an idealized, fully integrated, knowledge-based inference system 
will be limited to organizations in completely stable environments. 
Similar criticisms can be made of bureaucratic rationalizati~n (Loe 19E3). 
The co~clus ion to be drav~r? is that integrated information systems 
will only be of use for those aspects of the or~an;zation's activities where 
semantic stability can be mzintained. This conciusion corresponds to the 
empirical observations rilade by Gorry and Scott-KIortor? (1971), which 1 ~ d  
to the conception of 'decision s u p p r t  systems' (e.g., Keen and Scott- 
Morton (1978), Bonczek et a:. (lSEi), Fick aad S p r a g ~ e  (19SOj, So1 (1993). 
The underlying idea in the DSS work is to promote the dsvelo2ment of 
technology which, raiher t h . n  r e p l ~ c e  humzn cognition, sseks to assist 
and augment it. The trend seems to be to~;ards developing DSS 'genera- 
tors' which provide computational building blocks v2~ich can be variously 
structured for different ad-hoc, decision situations. 
Interestingly, despite the iiedely recognized importance cf group 
decision making, nearly all CSS packages are oriented to~rards  assisting 
the individual manager in isolation. The ex~lanatiox may be semantic: 
an individual can assign an interpretation to a particular syntactic 
representation (s)he invents. In a group setting however, the semantics 
is n e g o t i a t e d ,  and our technology so far seems to have had little effect on 
these socio-linguistic processes. 
SUMMARYREMARKS 
The preceding arguments can be summarized in the following state- 
ment: we make words m e a n  what w e  want. Three aspects are 
emphasized. 
Semantizs is plestic. A s  Tarskian model theory so bluntly poilits out, the 
semzatics cf e lznguage is ar- inierpretation assigned to it. Certain truths 
(logical truth) are tautolog~us i s  that they h.olZ under any interpretation 
(true in all possijre m ~ < e l s ) .  In organizational app!ications, ho~vever, we 
are more concerned with specific interpretations (synthetic truths, true 
in scjrne models, no: true in others). The validity of the inferences drawn 
depends on the stability of this interpretation. For example, 
LEKON (x) 4 YELLOW(x) 
is true if in fact all lemons zre yello?~.~, but fails if some botmist succeeds 
in generz t iq  a strain with different colors an6 declares that they, too, 
are lemol-is. 
We mkke words meari what we want. 
Semantic change has a pragmatic component, depending on the 
interests, preferences and values of its users. 
We make words mean what we want. 
Semantics is plastic, pragmatic, but also the product of social consensus. 
Indeed, i t  is not only socially determined, but socially understood. 
POST SC,R3" 
The pw-pose of- this p q e r  has beer, mainly to elaborste a proble :~  
rather than proaose spszific solutions. The point certainly hzs n o t  besn 
to discourage furth2r A! research. Rather, it may serve to explain some 
of the frustratioa felt in meny of attempts at  kno~vledge representation, 
particularly in mar~sgerial applications. As we suggest here, the probkm 
may be overif~helmiaglj~ difficult, requiring dtimately a forEal explicztion 
of all of sockty.  If that is the case, we ~ ~ o u l d  do ~l;ell to seek out more 
achievable goals and strztegies. 
Likewise, vre have to be careful not to overstate our claims. -4s 
pointed out in the beginning, A1 is getting market appeal. Big mccey is 
shifting. But the people behnd  those big deeisions aren't techniciens r,or 
theoreticians. They aren' t  accustomed to our tendency to ext rqola te  
world shaking impl',caticns from toy-sized implementetions. They may 
actually believe us. And the plans for 1984 are in the making now. 
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